The following zero-sum game between nature and a statistician blends Bayesian methods with frequentist methods such as p-values and confidence intervals.
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Motivation
Various compromises between Bayesian and frequentist approaches to statistical inference represent first attempts to combining attractive aspects of each approach (Good, 1983) . While the more recent the hybrid inference approach of Yuan (2009) succeeded in leveraging Bayesian point estimators with maximum likelihood estimates, reducing to the former or the latter in the presence or absence of a reliably estimated prior on all parameters, how to extend the theory beyond point estimation is not yet clear.
Further, hybrid inference in its current form does not cover the case of a parameter of interest that has a partially known prior. Since such partial knowledge of a prior occurs in many scientific inference situations, it calls for a theoretical framework for method development that appropriately blends Bayesian and frequentist methods.
Ideally, blended inference would meet these criteria:
1. Complete knowledge of the prior. If the prior is known, the corresponding posterior is used for inference. Among statisticians, this principle is almost universally acknowledged. However, it is rarely the case of the prior is known for all practical purposes.
2. Negligible knowledge of the prior. If there is no reliable knowledge of a prior, inference is based on methods that do not require such knowledge. This principle motivates not only the development of confidence intervals and pvalues but also Bayesian posteriors derived from improper and data-dependent priors. Accordingly, blended inference must allow the use of such methods when applicable.
3. Continuum between extremes. Inference relies on the prior to the extent that it is known while relying on the other methods to the extent that it is not known. Thus, there is a gradation of methodology between the above two extremes. The premise of this paper is that this intermediate scenario calls for a careful balance between pure Bayesian methods on one hand and impure Bayesian or non-Bayesian methods on the other hand.
Instead of framing the knowledge of a prior in terms of confidence intervals, as in pure empirical Bayes approaches, it will be framed more generally herein in terms of a set of plausible priors, as in interval probability (Weichselberger, 2000; Augustin, 2002 Augustin, , 2004 and robust Bayesian (Berger, 1984) approaches. Whereas the concept of an unknown prior cannot arise in strict Bayesian statistics, it does arise in robust Bayesian statistics when the levels of belief of an intelligent agent have not been fully assessed (Berger, 1984) . Unknown priors also occur in many more objective contexts involving purely frequentist interpretations of probability in terms of variability in the observable world rather than the uncertainty in the mind of an agent. For example, frequency-based priors are routinely estimated under random effects and empirical Bayes models; see, e.g., Efron (2010) . (Remark 1 comments further on interpretations of probability and relaxes the convenient assumption of a true prior.)
With respect to the problem at hand, the most relevant robust Bayesian approaches are the minimax Bayes risk ("Γ-minimax") practice of minimizing the maximum Bayes risk (Robbins, 1951; Berger, 1985; Vidakovic, 2000) and the maxmin expected utility ("conditional Γ-minimax") practice of maximizing the minimum posterior expected payoff or, equivalently, minimizing the maximum posterior expected loss (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989; DasGupta and Studden, 1989; Vidakovic, 2000; Augustin, 2002 Augustin, , 2004 . Augustin (2004) reviews both methods in terms of interval probabilities that need not be subjective. With typical loss functions, the former method meets the above criteria for classical minimax alternatives to Bayesian methods but does not apply to other attractive alternatives. For example, several confidence intervals, p-values, and objective-Bayes posteriors routinely used in biostatistics are not minimax optimal. (Fraser and Reid (1990) and Fraser (2004) argued that requiring the optimality of frequentist procedures can lead to trade-offs between hypothetical samples that potentially mislead scientists or yield pathological procedures.) Optimality in the classical sense is not required of the alternative procedures under the framework outlined below, which can be understood in terms of maxmin expected utility with a payoff function that incorporates the alternative procedures to be used as a benchmark for the Bayesian posteriors.
Heuristic overview
To define a general theory of blended inference that meets a formal statement of the three criteria, Section 2 introduces a variation of a zero-sum game of Topsøe (1979) , Harremoës and Topsøe (2001) , and Topsøe (2007) . (The discrete version of the game also appeared in Pfaffelhuber (1977) , and Grünwald and Philip Dawid (2004) interpreted it as a special case of the maxmin expected utility problem.) The "nature" opponent selects a prior consistent with the available knowledge as the "statistician" player selects a posterior distribution with the aim of maximizing the minimum information gained relative to one or more alternative methods. Such benchmark methods may be confidence interval procedures, frequentist hypothesis tests, or other techniques that are not necessarily Bayesian.
From that theory, Section 3 derives a widely applicable framework for testing hypotheses. For concreteness, the motivating results are heuristically summarized here. Consider the problem of testing H 0 : θ * = 0, the hypothesis that a real-valued parameter θ * of interest is equal to the point 0 on the real line R. The observed data vector x is modeled as a realization of a random variable denoted by X. Let p (x) denote the p-value resulting from a statistical test.
It has long been recognized that the p-value for a simple (point) null hypothesis is often smaller than Bayesian posterior probabilities of the hypothesis (Lindley, 1957; Berger and Sellke, 1987) . Suppose θ * has an unknown prior distribution according to which the prior probability of H 0 is π 0 . While π 0 is unknown, it is assumed to be no less than some known lower bound denoted by π 0 .
Following the methodology of Berger et al. (1994) , Sellke et al. (2001) found a generally applicable lower bound on the Bayes factor. As Section 3.1 will explain, that bound immediately leads to
( 1) as a lower bound on the unknown posterior probability of the null hypothesis for p (x) < 1/e and to π 0 as a lower bound on the probability if p (x) ≥ 1/e. In addition to Pr (H 0 |p (X) = p (x)) , the unknown Bayesian posterior probability of H 0 , there is a frequentist posterior probability of H 0 that will guide selection of a posterior probability for inference based on π 0 ≥ π 0 and other constraints summarized by Pr (H 0 |p (X) = p (x)) ≥ Pr (H 0 |p (X) = p (x)). While it is incorrect to interpret the p-value p (x) as a Bayesian probability, it will be seen in Section 3.2 that p (x) is a confidence posterior probability that H 0 is true.
With the confidence posterior as the benchmark, the solution to the optimization problem described above gives the blended posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true. It is simply the maximum of the p-value and the lower bound on the Bayesian posterior probability:
By plotting Pr (H 0 ; p (x)) as a function of p (x) and π 0 , Figures 1 and 2 illustrate each of the above criteria for blended inference:
1. Complete knowledge of the prior. In this example, the prior is only known when π 0 = 1, in which case
for all p (x). Thus, the p-value is ignored in the presence of a known prior.
2. Negligible knowledge of the prior. There is no knowledge of the prior when π 0 = 0 and negligible knowledge when π 0 is so low that
, and the Bayesian posteriors are ignored.
3. Continuum between extremes. When π 0 is of intermediate value in the
is exclusively between p (x) and 1,
Consequently, Pr (H 0 ; p (x)) increases gradually from p (x) to 1 as π 0 increases (Figures 1 and 2 ). In this case, the blended posterior lies in the set of allowed Bayesian posteriors but is on the boundary of that set that is the closest to the p-value. Thus, both the p-value and the Bayesian posteriors influence the blended posterior and thus the inferences made on its basis.
The plotted parameter distribution will be presented in Section 3.3 as a widely applicable blended posterior.
Finally, Section 4 offers additional details and generalizations in a series of remarks.
Figure 1: Blended posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true versus the p-value. The curves correspond to lower bounds of prior probabilities ranging in 5% increments from 0% on the bottom to 100% on the top.
Figure 2: Blended posterior probability that the null hypothesis is true versus the p-value and the lower bound of the prior probability that the null hypothesis is true. The top plot displays the full domain, half of which is shown in the bottom plot.
2 General theory
Preliminary notation and definitions
Denote the observed data set, typically a vector or matrix of observations, by x, a member of a set X that is endowed with a σ-algebra X. The value of x determines two sets of posterior distributions that can be blended for inference about the value of a target parameter. Much of the following notation is needed to transform general Bayesian posteriors and confidence posteriors or other benchmark posteriors such that they are defined on the same measurable space, that of the target parameter.
(A confidence posterior, to be defined in Section 3.2.1, is a parameter distribution from which confidence intervals and p-values may be extracted. As such, it facilitates blending typical frequentist procedures with Bayesian procedures.)
Bayesian posteriors
With some measurable space Θ * ,Ȧ * for parameter values inΘ * , let P prior * denote a set of probability distributions on X ×Θ * , X ⊗Ȧ * . Any distribution in P prior * is called a prior (distribution), understood in the broad sense of a model that includes the possible likelihood functions as well as the parameter distribution. It encodes the constraints and other information available about the parameter before observing x.
On the other hand, any distribution of a parameter is called a posterior (distribution) if it depends on x. For some P prior * ∈ P prior * , an example of a posterior distribu-
, where X is a random variable of a distribution on (X , X) that is determined by P prior * .Ṗ * is called a Bayesian posterior (distribution) since it is equal to a conditional distribution of the parameter given X = x.
Adapting an apt term from Topsøe (2007) , the setṖ * = P prior * (•|X = x) : P prior * ∈ P prior * of Bayesian posteriors on Θ * ,Ȧ * may be considered the "knowledge base." For a setΘ, ifτ :Θ * → Θ is anȦ * -measurable map and ifθ * has distributionṖ * ∈Ṗ * , thenθ =τ θ * , referred to as an inferential target ofṖ * , has induced probability space Θ, A,Ṗ . The seṫ P = Ṗ :τ θ * ∼Ṗ ,θ * ∼Ṗ * ∈Ṗ * of all distributions thereby induced and the set P of all probability distributions on (Θ, A) are related byṖ ⊆ P.
Example 1. In the hypothesis test of Section 1.2,θ = 0 if the null hypothesis thaṫ θ * = 0 is true andθ = 1 if the alternative hypothesis thatθ * = 0 is true, wherė θ * andθ are random variables with distributions respectively defined on the Borel space (R, B (R)) and the discrete space {0, 1} , 2 {0,1} , where 2 {0,1} is the power set of {0, 1}. Thus, in this case,τ is the indicator function
Section 3 considers this example in more detail.
A function that transforms a set of parameter distributions to a single parameter distribution on the same measurable space is called an inference process (Paris, 1994; Paris and Vencovská, 1997) . The resulting distribution is known as a "representation" (Augustin, 2002) or "reduction" (Bickel, 2011a) of the set. Perhaps the best known inference process for a discrete parameter set Θ is that of the maximum entropy principle, which would select a member ofṖ such that it has higher entropy than any other member of the set (see Remark 2). This paper will propose a wide class of inference processes such that each transformsṖ to a member of P on the basis the following concept of a benchmark distribution on (Θ, A).
Benchmark posteriors
For the convenience of the reader, the same Latin and Greek letters will be used for the set of posteriors that will represent a gold standard or benchmark method of inference as for the Bayesian posteriors of Section 2. rather than the single confidence posterior that is generated by exact confidence intervals (Bickel, 2011a) .) Suppose there exists a functionτ :P * → Θ such thatP , the probability distribution ofτ P * , is defined on (Θ, A).P is called the benchmark posterior (distribution), andθ =τ P * is the inferential target ofP * . It follows thaẗ P is in P but not necessarily inṖ.
Example 2. Consider a model in which the full parameterθ * ∈Θ * consists of an interest parameterθ and a nuisance parameterλ. The measurable space ofθ * = θ ,λ is denoted by Θ * ,Ȧ * , and that ofθ by (Θ, A). Suppose that a set of Bayesian posteriors is available forθ * but that nested confidence intervals are only available for an unknown parameter θ ∈ Θ. It follows that a confidence posterior P is available on (Θ, A) but not on Θ * ,Ȧ * . Then the framework of this section can be applied by using the functionτ such that θ =τ θ * in order to project the Bayesian posteriors onto (Θ, A), the measurable space on whichP is defined. In this case, since there is only one possible benchmark posterior, the functionτ need not be explicitly constructed.
The functionτ allows consideration of a set of possible benchmark posteriors by transforming it to a single benchmark posterior defined on (Θ, A), the same measurable space as the above Bayesian posteriors ofθ. Since that function is unusual, two ways to compose it will now be explained.
Example 3. Consider the inference processΠ :P * → P * , where P * is the set of all probability distributions on Θ * ,Ä * . Define the random variableθ * to have distributionΠ P * (•) =Π P * . Ifτ :Θ * → Θ is anÄ * -measurable function, then θ =τ θ * is the inferential target ofP * . Further, the distributionP ofθ is the benchmark posterior.
Example 4. Whereas Example 3 applied an inference process before a parameter transformation, this example reverses the order by first applyingτ . LetP denote the subset of P consisting of all distributions of the parameters transformed byτ :
Then an inference process transformsP to the benchmark posteriorP , which in turn is the distribution ofθ, the inferential target ofP * .
Blended inference
In terms of Radon-Nikodym differentiation, the information divergence of P with respect to Q on (Θ, A) is
if P Q and I (P ||Q) = ∞ otherwise. I (P ||Q) is also known as cross/relative entropy, I-divergence, information for discrimination, and Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Other measures of information may also be used (Remark 3). For any posteriorṡ P ∈Ṗ and Q ∈ P, the inferential gain I Ṗ ||P Q of Q relative toP givenṖ is the amount of information gained by making inferences on the basis of Q instead of the benchmark posteriorP :
LetṖ P denote the largest subset ofṖ such that the information divergence of any of its members with respect toP is finite. That is,
which is nonempty by assumption. (The assumption is not necessary under the generalization described in Remark 4.)
The blended posterior (distribution)P is the probability distribution on (Θ, A)
that maximizes the inferential gain relative to the benchmark posterior given the worst-case posterior restricted by the constraints that definedṖ andṖ P :
where the supremum and infinum over any set including an indeterminate number are ∞ and −∞, respectively (Topsøe, 2007) . Inferences based onP are blended in the sense that they depend on bothṖ andP in the ways to be specified in Section 2.3.
The main result of Theorem 2 of Topsøe (2007) gives a simply stated solution of the optimality problem of equation (5) under broad conditions. Proposition 1. If I Ṗ ||P < ∞ for someṖ ∈Ṗ and ifṖ P is convex, then the blended posteriorP is the probability distribution inṖ that minimizes the information divergence with respect to the benchmark posterior:
Proof. Topsøe (2007) proved the result from inequalities of information theory given the additional stated condition of his Theorem 2 that I Ṗ ||P < ∞ for allṖ ∈ P P . (See Remark 4.) The condition that I Ṗ ||P < ∞ for someṖ ∈Ṗ and the above definition ofṖ P ensure that the condition is met.
Alternatively, the minimization of information divergence may defineP rather than result from its definition in terms of the game (Remark 5).
Properties of blended inference
The desiderata of Section 1 for blended inference can now be formalized. A posterior distributionP •;Ṗ,P on (Θ, A) is said to blend the setṖ of Bayesian posteriors with the benchmark posteriorP for inference about the parameter in Θ provided that P •;Ṗ,P satisfies the following criteria under the conditions of Proposition 1:
1. Complete knowledge of the prior. IfṖ has a single memberṖ , theñ
2. Negligible knowledge of the prior. IfP ∈Ṗ and ifṖ has at least two members, thenP •;Ṗ,P =P .
3. Continuum between extremes. For any D ≥ 0 and any P ⊆ P such that
and such thatṖ P ∪ P is convex, I P •;Ṗ ∪ P ,P ||P − I P •;Ṗ,P ||P ≤ D. Proof. Since the criteria are only required under the conditions of Proposition 1, it will suffice to prove that the criteria follow from equation (6). IfṖ has a single membeṙ P , then equation (6) implies thatP =Ṗ , thereby ensuring Criterion 1. Similarly, ifP ∈Ṗ, then equation (6) implies thatP =P , thus proving that Criterion 2 is met. Assume, contrary to Criterion 3, that there exist a D ≥ 0 and a P ⊆ P such thatṖ P ∪ P is convex, equation (7) is true, and equation (8) is false with P •;Ṗ ∪ P ,P andP •;Ṗ,P equal to the blended posteriors respectively usinġ P ∪ P andṖ as the sets of Bayesian posteriors. Then equation (6) can be written as
Hence, with a ∧ b signifying the minimum of a and b, I P •;Ṗ ∪ P ,P ||P − I P •;Ṗ,P ||P = inḟ P ∈Ṗ(P )
which cannot exceed infṖ ∈Ṗ(P ) I Ṗ ||P − inf P ∈P I P ||P and thus, according to equation (7), cannot exceed D. Therefore, the above assumption that equation (8) is false is contradicted, thereby establishing satisfaction of Criterion 3.
Example 5. Suppose the set of possible priors consists of a single frequency-matching prior, i.e., a prior that leads to 95% posterior credible intervals that are equal to 95% confidence intervals, etc. If the benchmark posterior is the confidence posterior that yields the same confidence intervals, then it is the Bayesian posterior distribution corresponding to the prior. In that case, the blended distribution is equal to that Bayesian/confidence posterior. Thus, the first condition of blended inference applies.
The second condition would instead apply if the set of possible priors contained at least one other prior in addition to the frequency-matching prior.
Criterion 3 is much stronger than the heuristic idea of continuity introduced in Section 1.1. Its use of information divergence can be generalized to other measures of divergence (Remark 3).
Blended hypothesis testing
A fertile field of application for the theory of Section 2 is that of testing hypotheses, as outlined in Section 1.2. Building on Example 1, this section provides methodology for a wide class of models used in hypothesis testing.
A bound on the Bayesian posterior
Defining that class in terms of the concepts of Section 2.1.1 requires additional notation. For a continuous sample space X and a function p : X → [0, 1] such that p (X) ∼ U (0, 1) under a null hypothesis, each p (x) for any x ∈ X will be called a pvalue. Using some dominating measure, let f 0 and f 1 denote probability density functions of p (X) under the null hypothesis θ = 0 and under the alternative hypothesis θ = 1 , respectively. For the observed x, the likelihood ratio f 0 (p (x)) /f 1 (p (x)) is called the Bayes factor since, for a prior distribution P prior * , Bayes's theorem gives
where ϕ (p (x)) = P prior * θ = 0|p (X) = p (x) . Here, as ϕ (p (x)) is a local false discovery rate (LFDR), the letter ϕ abbreviates "false" (Efron, 2010; Bickel, 2011c) .
In a parametric setting, f 1 (p (x)) would be the likelihood integrated over the prior distribution conditional on the alternative hypothesis.
Let κ : X → R denote the function defined by the transformation κ (x) = − log p (x) for all x ∈ X . Then a probability density of κ (X) under the null hypothesis is the standard exponential density g 0 (κ (x)) = e −κ(x) . Assume that, under the alternative hypothesis θ = 1 , κ (X) admits a density function g 1 with respect to the same dominating measure as g 0 . It follows that g 0 (κ (x)) /g 1 (κ (x)) = f 0 (p (x)) /f 1 (p (x)). The hazard rate h 1 (κ (x)) under the alternative is defined by Lemma 1. If h 1 is nonincreasing, then, for all x ∈ X ,
The condition on the hazard rate defines a wide class of models that is useful for testing simple null hypotheses. A broad subclass will now be defined by imposing constraints on π 0 = P prior * θ = 0 , the prior probability that the null hypothesis is true, in addition to the hazard rate condition. Specifically, π 0 is known to have π 0 ∈ [0, 1] as a lower bound. Thus, rearranging equation (9) as
, leading to equation (1).
Let P consist of all probability distributions on (Θ, A) = {0, 1} , 2 {0,1} . The subsetṖ consists of allṖ ∈ P such thatṖ θ = 0 ≥ ϕ (p (x)).
3.2 A confidence benchmark posterior
Confidence posterior theory
The following parametric framework facilitates the application of Section 2.1.2 to hypothesis testing. The observation x is an outcome of the random variableẌ of probability space (X , X, P θ * ,λ * ), where the interest parameter θ * ∈Θ * and a nuisance parameter λ * (in some setΛ * ) are unknown. Let S :Θ * ×X → [0, 1] and t : X ×Θ * → R denote functions such that S (•; x) is a distribution function, S (θ * ; X) ∼ U (0, 1),
for all x ∈ X , θ * ∈Θ * , and λ * ∈Λ * . S is known as a significance function, and t as a pivot or test statistic. It follows that p (x) = S (0; x) is a p-value for testing the hypothesis that θ * = 0 and that [S −1 (α; X) , S −1 (β; X)] is a (β − α) 100% confidence interval for θ * given any α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [α, 1]. Thus, whether a significance function is found from p-values over a set of simple null hypotheses or instead from a set of nested confidence intervals, it contains the information needed to derive either (Schweder and Hjort, 2002; Singh et al., 2007; Bickel, 2011a,b) .
Letθ * denote the random variable of the probability measureP * that has S (•; x) as its distribution function. In other words,P * θ * ≤ θ * = S (θ * ; x) for all θ * ∈Θ * .P * is called a confidence posterior (distribution) since it equates the frequentist coverage rate of a confidence interval with the probability that the parameter lies in the fixed, observed confidence interval:
for all x ∈ X , θ * ∈Θ * , and λ * ∈Λ * . The term "confidence posterior" (Bickel, 2011a,b) is preferred here over the usual term "confidence distribution" (Schweder and Hjort, 2002) to emphasize its use as an alternative to Bayesian posterior distributions.
Polansky (2007), Singh et al. (2007) , and Bickel (2011a) provide generalizations to vector parameters of interest. Extensions based on multiple comparison procedures are sketched in Remark 6.
A confidence posterior for testing
For the application to two-sided testing of a simple null hypothesis, let θ * = |θ * * |, the absolute value of a real parameter θ * * of interest, leading toΘ * = [0, ∞). Then p (x) = S (0; x) is equivalent to a two-tailed p-value for testing the hypothesis that θ * * = 0. SinceP * θ * ≤ 0 = S (0; x) and sinceP * θ * ≤ 0 =P * θ * = 0 , it follows that p (x) =P * θ * = 0 , i.e., the p-value is equal to the probability that the mull hypothesis is true.
IfP * is the only confidence posterior under consideration, thenP * = P * , and there is no need for an inference process. Following the terminology of Example 3, τ :Θ * → Θ is defined byτ θ * = 1 (0,∞) θ * . By implication,θ = 0 ifθ * = 0 and
Example 6. In the various t-tests, θ * is the mean of X or a difference in means, and the statistic t (X; 0) is the absolute value of a statistic with a Student t distribution of known degrees of freedom. The above formalism then gives the usual two-sided p-value from a t-test asP θ = 0 and p (x). Specials cases of thisP have been presented as fiducial distributions (van Berkum et al. (1996); Bickel, 2011d) .
A blended posterior for testing
This subsection blends the above setṖ of Bayesian posteriors with the above confidence posteriorP as prescribed by Section 2.2. Gathering the results of Sections 3.1 and 3.2,Ṗ = Ṗ ∈ P :Ṗ θ = 0 ≥ ϕ (p (x)) ;
Equation (4) then implies thaṫ
in which the first inequality is strict if and only if ϕ (p (x)) = 0 and the second inequality is strict unless p (x) = 1. SinceṖ P is convex, Proposition 1 yieldŝ
where θ is the random variable of distributionP . With the identities ϕ (p (x)) = Pr (H 0 |p (X) = p (x)) andP (θ = 0) = Pr (H 0 ; p (x)) and with the establishment of equation (1) by Section 3.1, equation (11) verifies the claim of equation (2) made in Section 1.2.
Remark 1. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the use of Bayes's theorem with proper priors need not involve subjective interpretations of probability. The set of posteriors may be determined by interval constraints on the corresponding priors without any requirement that they model levels of belief (Weichselberger, 2000; Augustin, 2002 Augustin, , 2004 . However, subjective applications of blended inference are also possible. While the framework was developed with an unknown prior in mind, the concept of imprecise or indeterminate probability (Walley, 1991) could take the place of the set in which an unknown prior lies. By allowing the partial order of agent preferences, imprecise probability theories need not assume the existence of any true prior (Walley, 1991; Coletti and Scozzafava, 2002) . As often happens, the same mathematical framework is subject to very different philosophical interpretations.
Remark 2. Technically, the principle of maximum entropy (Paris, 1994; Paris and Vencovská, 1997) mentioned in Section 2.1.1 could be used if Θ is finite or countable infinite. However, unlike the proposed methodology, that practice is equivalent to making the benchmark posteriorP depend on the functionτ that maps a parameter space to Θ rather than on a method of data analysis that is coherent in the sense that its posterior depends on the data rather than on the hypothesis. If blending with such a method is not desired, one may average the Bayesian posteriors with respect to some measure that is not a function of Θ. For example, averaging with respect to the Lebesgue measure, as Bickel (2011a) did with confidence posteriors, leads to 1 + ϕ (p (x)) /2 as the posterior probability of the null hypothesis under the assumptions of Section 3.1. Remark 5 discusses a more tenable version of the maximum entropy principle for blended inference.
Remark 3. Using definitions of divergence that include information divergence (3) as a special case, Grünwald and Philip Dawid (2004) and Topsøe (2004) generalized variations of Proposition 1. The theory of blended inference extends accordingly.
Remark 4. A generalization of Section 2 in a different direction from that of Remark 3 replaces each "infṖ ∈Ṗ(P ) " of equation (5) with "infṖ ∈Ṗ ." For that optimization problem, Theorem 2 of Topsøe (2007) has the condition thatṖ ∈Ṗ =⇒ I Ṗ ||P < ∞ in addition to the convexity ofṖ that Proposition 1 of the present paper requires.
Thus, in that formulation, the blended posteriorP need not satisfy equation (6) even ifṖ is convex.
Remark 5. A posterior distributionP that is defined by
satisfies the desiderata of Section 2.3 whether or not the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. While certain axiomatic systems (e.g., Csiszár, 1991) lead to this generalization of the principle of maximum entropy (Remark 2), the optimization problem of equation (5) seems more compelling in this context and definesP even when no distribution satisfying equation (12) exists.
Remark 6. In the presence of multiple comparisons, the confidence posteriors of Section 3.2.1 may be adjusted to control a family-wise error rate or false coverage rate (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2005) , if desired. Either error rate would then take the place of the conventional confidence level as the confidence posterior probability.
